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The flowering of human society depends on two factors: the intellectual power of 
outstanding men to conceive sound social and economic theories, and the ability 
of these or other men to make these ideologies palatable to the majority. (Mises 
1998a, p. 864) 
 
From what precedes, two conclusions can be drawn: (1) Sophisms must be more 
abundant in the social sciences than in any others, for they are the ones in which 
each person consults only his own opinion or his own instinctive feelings; and (2) 
it is in these sciences that sophisms are especially harmful, because they 
mislead public opinion in a field in which public opinion is authoritative—is, 
indeed, law. (Bastiat 1964a, p. 123) 
 
1.  Introduction 
Even some of Ludwig von Mises' staunchest admirers have found his political analysis 
naïve.  It was no fault of his, they hasten to add, that his most productive decades 
preceded the rise of modern public choice scholarship.  But it would be overgenerous to 
call him "ahead of his time."  Thus, according to Peter Boettke, Mises'... 
... commitment to the assumption of public official benevolence translated into an 
assertion of public interest motivation behind economic policy. But, as 
subsequent developments in public choice theory have argued, the assumption 
of benevolence provides a woefully deficient foundation for understanding the 
logic of politics within representative democracies. (2001, p. 12) 
 
For Boettke, modern public choice challenges “the effectiveness of Mises‟ core analytical 
assumptions for generating policy relevant political economy."  Indeed, he goes so far as 
to conclude that “Mises‟ exhortation for government to pursue „sound‟ economic policies 
in the face of public choice logic was futile.” (2001, p. 12) 
 
The current paper challenges negative appraisals of Mises' political economy.  He was 
indeed ahead of his time.  Mises leapfrogged over the major mistakes in the public 
choice consensus, proceeding straight to the more sophisticated view favored by 
scholarship of the past decade.  We argue further that Frederic Bastiat, famously 
belittled by Schumpeter for his lack of theoretical novelty, shares Mises' foresighted 
economics of politics.1 
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Mises and Bastiat disagree with conventional public choice theory in two fundamental 
ways. First, Mises and Bastiat are much more optimistic about the tendency of the 
democratic mechanism to translate public opinion into policy.  While they acknowledge 
the existence of lags and other frictions, they regard them as exceptions that prove the 
rule.  Conventional public choice analysis, in contrast, sees a severe agency problem at 
the heart of democracy.  It accordingly puts far greater emphasis on the ability of special 
interests - including politicians and bureaucrats themselves - to highjack the democratic 
process.   
 
Second, Mises and Bastiat are sharply more pessimistic about public opinion.  In 
modern terms, they believe that the general public suffers from systematically biased 
beliefs about economics. The public imagines, among other oddities, that protectionism 
raises domestic living standards, minimum wages do not create unemployment, and 
giving consumers fewer options makes them better off.  Conventional public choice, in 
contrast, generally holds that public opinion opposes inefficient policies, at least those 
that redistribute from the majority to minorities.  The only way politicians who favor such 
policies stay popular is by preventing the public from learning that they preach the public 
interest but serve the special interests. 
 
Both the Mises-Bastiat view and the standard public choice view reach relatively 
negative conclusions about democracy.  But the two positions appeal to contradictory 
mechanisms.  In the usual public choice view, the problem with democracy is that the 
voters are right, but ignored.  In the Mises-Bastiat view, the problem with democracy is 
that the voters are wrong, but heeded. 
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We structure the paper as follows.  Section two explores Mises' economics of politics in 
detail.  Section three does the same for Bastiat.  Section four contrasts their position with 
that of traditional public choice.  Section five explains how recent theoretical and 
empirical work supports the supposedly naive Mises-Bastiat view.  Section six 
investigates the areas in which Mises' and Bastiat's foresighted writings point to fruitful 
avenues for future research.  Section seven concludes. 
 
2.  The Public Choice of Ludwig von Mises 
Free-market thinkers typically denigrate the tendency of the democratic process to heed 
majority preferences.  In spite of his unquestioned free-market credentials, Mises has no 
sympathy for this line of thought.  In fact, he embraces an extreme version of the 
position found in most high school civics textbooks. Behind the veil of the political 
process stands what really matters: the voice of the people.  
What determines the course of a nation's economic policies is always the 
economic ideas held by public opinion. No government, whether democratic or 
dictatorial, can free itself from the sway of the generally accepted ideology. 
(1998a, p. 850) 
 
Indeed, Mises practically embraces a monocausal theory in which public opinion is all 
that matters
2
: 
The supremacy of public opinion determines not only the singular role that 
economics occupies in the complex of thought and knowledge. It determines the 
whole process of human history. (1998a, p.863) 
 
Note well that he is not theorizing about how ideal democracy "should work."  He is 
making the descriptive claim that democracy as it exists impels politicians to embrace 
and implement whatever policies are most popular.  Mises dismisses, for instance, the 
view that the end of the gold standard was foisted on an unwilling public: 
Whatever the constitutional state of affairs may be, no government could embark 
upon "raising the price of gold" if public opinion were opposed to such a 
manipulation. If, on the other hand, public opinion favors such a step, no legal 
technicalities could check it altogether or even delay it for a short time. What 
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happened in Great Britain in 1931, in the United States in 1933, and in France 
and Switzerland in 1936 clearly shows that the apparatus of representative 
government is able to work with the utmost speed if public opinion endorses the 
so-called experts' opinion concerning the expediency and necessity of a 
currency's devaluation. (1998a, p. 788) 
 
His claim is symmetric.  Without public support, the change would never have happened; 
with public support, the change could not have been stopped.  In terms of logic, Mises is 
saying "if and only if." 
 
What mechanism connects public opinion and policy?  At the most fundamental level, 
politicians in tune with public opinion tend to win positions of authority; politicians out of 
sync with public opinion tend to be removed from office: 
A statesman can succeed only insofar as his plans are adjusted to the climate of 
opinion of his time, that is to the ideas that have got hold of his fellows' minds. He 
can become a leader only if he is prepared to guide people along the paths they 
want to walk and toward the goal they want to attain. A statesman who 
antagonizes public opinion is doomed to failure... [T]he politician must give the 
people what they wish to get, very much as a businessman must supply the 
customers with the things they wish to acquire. (1985, p.186) 
  
Coming from Mises, the final analogy is striking.  His analysis of the entrepreneur-
consumer link is packed with superlatives: 
In the capitalist system of society's economic organization the entrepreneurs 
determine the course of production.  In the performance of this function they are 
unconditionally and totally subject to the sovereignty of the buying public, the 
consumers.  If they fail to produce in the cheapest and best possible way the 
commodities which the consumers are asking for most urgently, they suffer 
losses and are finally eliminated from their entrepreneurial position. (1980, p.108) 
 
It is extraordinary, then, that Mises freely compares the politician's dependence on the 
public with the businessman's dependence on consumers.  What is his rationale?  To 
use modern terms: the median voter model. Voters have preferences, and prefer 
politicians who support those preferences.  Since politicians want to win, they have a 
clear incentive to conform: "No matter what the constitution of the country, governments 
always have to pursue that policy which is deemed right and beneficial by public opinion.  
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Were they to attempt to stand up against the prevailing doctrines they would very soon 
lose their positions to men willing to conform to the demands of the man in the street." 
(1998b, p.xii)   
 
Political agency problems are, for Mises, of little importance: 
To achieve the ends for which democratic institutions strive it is only necessary 
that legislation and administration shall be guided according to the will of the 
majority and for this purpose indirect democracy is completely satisfactory.  The 
essence of democracy is not that everyone makes and administers laws but that 
lawgivers and rulers should be dependent on the people's will in such a way that 
they may be peaceably changed if conflict occurs. (1981a, p. 63; emphasis 
added) 
 
If democracy is such a great tool for matching public opinion and public policy, how 
could he have been so critical of the political-economic direction of the 20th century? 
Quite simply, Mises questions the wisdom of public opinion.3  The public commits an 
array of what we would now call systematic mistakes: 
Democracy guarantees a system of government in accordance with the wishes 
and plans of the majority.  But it cannot prevent majorities from falling victim to 
erroneous ideas and from adopting inappropriate policies which not only fail to 
realize the ends aimed at but result in disaster. (1998a, p.193) 
 
Mises naturally focuses on the public's erroneous ideas about economics: "The fact that 
the majority of our contemporaries, the masses of semi-barbarians led by self-styled 
intellectuals, entirely ignore everything that economics has brought forward, is the main 
political problem of our age." (1981b, p. 325)  What makes the situation so dire?  
The body of economic knowledge is an essential element in the structure of 
human civilization; it is the foundation upon which modern industrialism and all 
the moral, intellectual, technological, and therapeutical achievements of the last 
centuries have been built... [I]f [men] fail to take the best advantage of it and 
disregard its teachings and warnings, they will not annul economics; they will 
stamp out society and the human race. (1998a, p.885) 
 
Mises criticizes the economic beliefs of the general public on many dimensions.  But the 
overriding errors he identifies are underestimation of the social benefits of laissez-faire 
and overestimation of the social benefits of socialism.  Though he was convinced that 
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free markets lead to cooperation and socialism to chaos, Mises did not imagine that his 
views were widely shared: 
There is no use in deceiving ourselves.  American public opinion rejects the 
market economy. (1981b, p. 325)   
 
It cannot be denied that dictatorship, interventionism, and socialism are 
extremely popular today.  No argument of logic can weaken this popularity.  
(1998b, p. 85) 
 
He uses the same analysis to explain more specific aspects of government policy.  Take 
international trade.  Mises (1998a, p.83) credits the 19th century move to free trade to the 
public's acceptance of economic law: "The nineteenth-century success of free trade 
ideas was effected by the theories of classical economics." Conversely, he blames the 
retreat from free trade to the revival of earlier misconceptions: "The ultimate foundation 
of modern protectionism and of the striving for economic autarky of each country is to be 
found in this mistaken belief that they are the best means to make every citizen, or at 
least the immense majority of them, richer." (1998a, p.317)  
 
Mises' writings predate the modern technical distinction between mere ignorance and 
actual irrationality.4 (Sheffrin 1996; Pesaran 1987)  But he strongly leans in the latter 
direction.  Consider Mises‟ analysis of unemployment and labor regulations.  At first 
glance, he seems to claim that the public has never heard the standard economic 
arguments: "Public opinion fails to realize that the real cause for the permanent and 
large unemployment is to be sought in the wage policy of the trade unions and in the 
assistance granted to such policy by the government.  The voice of the economist does 
not reach the public." (1998b, p. 33, emphasis added)  But Mises also admits that when 
the voice of the economist does reach the public, it is rarely heeded.  After discussing 
economists' centuries-long opposition to "progressive" policies, he (1998b, p.xi) 
observes that "Governments, political parties, and public opinion have just as 
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persistently ignored their warnings.  They ridiculed the alleged doctrinarism of 'orthodox' 
economics and boasted of their 'victories' over economic theory."  
 
Thus, even when the public is seated at the banquet of economic knowledge, it refuses 
to eat.  How is this possible? People are, in essence, refusing to use their rational 
faculties5: 
The fanatics obstinately refuse to listen to the teachings of economic theory.  
Experience fails to teach them anything.  They stubbornly adhere to their 
previous opinions. (1998b, p.85) 
 
The man on the street is not innocently "out of the loop."  He is a willfully illogical 
"fanatic."   
 
 
In contrast, when most economists analyze the public's systematic biases they quickly 
blame interest groups for spreading false information.  But Mises emphasizes joint 
causation.  Fallacies are only persuasive because the public fails to exercise common-
sense skepticism: 
The main propaganda trick of the supporters of the allegedly 'progressive' policy 
of government control is to blame capitalism for all that is unsatisfactory in 
present-day conditions and to extol the blessings which socialism has in store for 
mankind.  They have never attempted to prove their fallacious dogmas or still 
less to refute the objections raised by the economists.  All they did was to call 
their adversaries names and to cast suspicion upon their motives.  And, 
unfortunately, the average citizen cannot see through these stratagems. (1969, 
p. 111) 
 
But does not Mises ceaselessly inveigh against special interests, with whom "nothing 
counts but the short-run concerns of the group they are serving" (1998a, p.869)?  Indeed 
he does.  But public sympathy is the necessary catalyst.  Special interests always want 
government assistance.  Whether or not they can get it - indeed, whether or not asking is 
worth the trouble - hinges on majority opinion.  
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What about politicians themselves?  While Mises occasionally imputes cynical motives 
to statist politicians, he sees them as largely sincere.  Indeed, he interestingly maintains 
that "true believers" have a competitive advantage over opportunists:  "But in the end, 
prophets who in their heart know themselves to be false cannot prevail against those 
filled with the power of sincere conviction." (1981a, p. 461)  If politicians are snake oil 
salesmen, they are snake oil salesmen who by and large believe their brand of snake oil 
is safe and effective. 
 
Stories like Mises' have often been accused of being "pessimistic."  This objection is not 
only scientifically irrelevant, but false as well.  After all, if special interests trump public 
opinion, then economists' efforts to enlighten the public are futile.  Why bother 
convincing mere figureheads?  In Mises‟ view, however, economic education can move 
mountains.  Changing public opinion in the right ways is virtually a sufficient condition for 
stopping socialism and even reviving laissez-faire:  
The world inclines to Socialism because the great majority of people want it.  
They want it because they believe that Socialism will guarantee a higher 
standard of welfare.  The loss of this conviction would signify the end of 
Socialism. (1981a, p. 462) 
 
[I]f a revolution in public opinion could once more give capitalism free rein, the 
world will be able gradually to raise itself from the condition into which the 
policies of the combined anticapitalist factions have plunged it. (1978, p.156) 
 
Thus, in spite of a number of negative observations about the general public, Mises 
remains eager to communicate with it in order to improve public policy. 
 
3.  The Public Choice of Frederic Bastiat 
Interspersed throughout the writings of Frederic Bastiat, one can find a political economy 
in the same spirit as Mises‟.  Bastiat has confidence in the power of majority voting to 
make politicians bow to public opinion: "Political power, the law-making ability, the 
enforcement of the law, have all passed, virtually, if not yet completely in fact, into the 
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hands of the people, along with universal suffrage." (1964b, p.92)   While he recognizes 
that institutional details may have marginal effects on policy, he downplays them: 
"[P]ublic opinion, whether enlightened or misguided, is nonetheless mistress of the 
world." (1964c, p.272) 
 
Bastiat grants that democracy's claim to represent the people is well-grounded in fact,  
but he sharply criticizes the policies that democracies adopt.  Proponents of democracy 
would almost automatically see these positions as contradictory. However, they fail to 
ask the most important question: “When it is time to vote, apparently the voter is not to 
be asked for any guarantee of his wisdom. His will and capacity to choose wisely are 
taken for granted." (1998, p.60)  This is a serious sin of omission because public opinion 
is riddled with systematic errors, or, as Bastiat terms them, "sophisms."   
 
Perhaps the public is not fully culpable because others have misled them. But the 
nonsense majorities have endorsed practically has no limit.  To take Bastiat's most 
famous example, he accuses the public of "broken window" thinking - ignoring 
opportunity costs. People favor wasteful government programs because they fail to 
consider the alternative uses of wasted resources.  They want a large military in 
peacetime because they implicitly assume that there is nothing else for discharged 
soldiers to do.  They favor fruitless public works projects to "create jobs," not realizing 
that the taxes that fund these projects destroy as many jobs as they create. 
 
And this is only one popular fallacy out of many.  Indeed, probably no one has dissected 
the public's misconceptions as thoroughly as Bastiat.  Unfortunately, this often leads 
readers to misinterpret him as merely an economic educator.  Much more is going on.  
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His analysis of sophisms is the cornerstone of his positive political economy.  As 
economic confusion rises, the quality of policy falls:   
When one of these fundamental errors... becomes firmly established as a 
conventional judgment, unquestionably accepted and agreed to by everybody, it 
tends to proceed from theory to practice, from thought to action. (1964c, p. 272) 
 
Bastiat repeatedly calls the public "ignorant," but in modern terminology “systematically 
biased” is the charge he has in mind.  Their errors are willful: The people "shut their 
eyes" to "simple truths." (1964a, p. 115)  Although they have never studied economics, 
non-economists treat their prejudices as fact, and resist efforts to correct them: 
If someone needs to solve a problem in chemistry or geometry, he does not 
pretend to have an innate knowledge of the science…  But in the social sciences, 
people acknowledge scarcely any authorities. (1964a, p. 122-3) 
 
One of Bastiat's chief hopes is to break through the public's dogmatism: "It is not my 
expectation that when the reader puts down this book he will cry out, 'I know!'  Would to 
heaven that he might honestly say to himself, 'I don't know!'" (1964a, p. 124) Like Mises, 
he emphasizes the "fanaticism" of his opponents: "Yet all these sectaries were acting in 
good faith, and this made them all the more dangerous; for a sincere commitment to 
error is fanaticism..." (1964c, p. 272)  
 
Bastiat did not dislike the common man, but the same cannot be said for special 
interests, who he denounces as "robbers" (and worse!).  But as a descriptive matter, 
there is joint causation.  Special interests work through public opinion rather than against 
it.  Interests do not persuade the legislator to harm his constituents; they convince the 
constituents to ask to be harmed:   
Protectionism is too popular for its adherents to be regarded as insincere.  If the 
majority had faith in free trade, we should have free trade.  It is doubtless motives 
of self-interest that have been responsible for the imposition of tariffs, but only 
after having produced sincere conviction. (1964a, p. 45) 
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If the public exercised common-sense skepticism, lobbying for protectionism would be 
pointless.  Indeed, interest groups' tactics show how little autonomy politicians have vis-
a-vis the electorate. They have no need to deceive the powerless. The key then for 
Bastiat is to educate the public of policies that would best serve their interests.  
 
4.  Traditional Public Choice 
Any generalization about a diverse and decades-old research program like public choice 
is bound to admit exceptions.  But we can fairly assert that the main thrust of public 
choice scholarship from the 1960s to the 1980s cuts directly against the Mises-Bastiat 
approach.  While both views maintain that democracies regularly adopt policies contrary 
to majority interests, traditional public choice puts great weight on agency problems and 
little on defective public opinion.6 
 
Wagner aptly expresses the standard view: “It is surely a reasonable presumption that 
societal processes are dominated by an organized intensity of interest and effort.” (2003, 
p.18) Considerable debate has occurred, however, about the severity of democracy's 
agency problems and the extent of insiders' "domination."7  Nevertheless, agency 
problems - whether large or small - are the preferred explanation for the existence of 
policies that harm the majority. 
     
A case in point: Why do we have farm subsidies? How can they exist when they are 
economically harmful to a majority of citizens? The standard public choice explanation is 
special interests.  Strong farm interests are more effective at lobbying for government 
handouts than the amorphous public is at blocking them.  As Gwartney and Wagner 
explain:   
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When the benefits are concentrated and the cost diffused, politicians will be led 
as if by an invisible hand to serve the purposes of the well-organized, 
concentrated beneficiaries…Of course, the average ("rationally ignorant") voter is 
totally unaware that special interest policies have pushed up the price of sugar, 
while the sugar farmers are among the leading contributors to those politicians 
who exert a key impact on agricultural policy. (1988, p.21) 
 
The tacit assumption is that the public would oppose such measures if it knew they 
existed. People grasp the basic truth that tariffs hurt their interests.  Yet because one 
vote has little effect on policy, they choose to remain ignorant about the vital details: 
what tariffs exist and who is responsible for them.  Therefore, punishing politicians for 
their misdeeds is difficult.8  Special interests, in contrast, have strong incentives to get 
informed and actively participate in the political process—their livelihood depends on it.  
Thus, even if a comfortable majority opposes a given policy in the abstract, special 
interests tend to prevail. 
 
One must not forget, moreover, that politicians and special interests can be one and the 
same.  If a politician can covertly help farmers, he can covertly help himself.  Politicians 
could win elections by offering the most popular platform, but then ignore their assigned 
mandate and do as they please.  As Charles Rowley puts it: 
[T]here is no guarantee that a government elected on a median voter platform 
will honor its political pledges. As the 1992 Clinton presidential victory 
demonstrates, elected officials may cynically jettison all their electoral pledges 
immediately following an election and rely upon voters‟ failing memories to carry 
them forward to subsequent electoral success. (1994, p.292, emphasis original) 
 
The complexities of indirect democracy intensify these problems, making it even harder 
for voters to identify and punish misconduct.  How should the blame for deficits of the 
1980s be divided between House, Senate and president?  And even if the electorate 
were lucky enough to spot bureaucratic excesses, what instruments do they have to 
discipline unelected officials?  Other features of indirect democracy, particularly 
geographical representation, create "fiscal commons" problems because representatives 
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care about what their district gets rather than the fiscal health of the nation as a whole. 
(Holcombe 1985)  
  
Although some public choice economists maintain that little can be done to overcome 
special interests (Tullock 1987), most emphasize improved institutional design, 
particularly at the constitutional level. (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Brennan and 
Buchanan 1985)  Preaching will not solve agency problems, but smarter political 
constraints might.  Separation of powers, bicameralism and term limits are but a few 
proposals designed to make government better serve the public. (Anthony, 1998; 
Bradbury and Crain, 2002; Crane and Pilon, 1994) 
 
5.  Recent Evidence 
Over the past decade, economists have heavily criticized traditional public choice on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds.  We maintain that these criticisms are largely 
correct.  When combined, moreover, they leave a picture of democracy strikingly similar 
to that of Mises and Bastiat.  Instead of chiding them for failing to anticipate the public 
choice revolution, we should hail the Mises-Bastiat view for leapfrogging over a 
persuasive but often wrong-headed intellectual detour.  
 
a.  Wittman's The Myth of Democratic Failure 
Many theorists have criticized various aspects of standard public choice theory. (Becker 
1983; Stigler 1986; Wittman 1989)  Donald Wittman's (1995) The Myth of Democratic 
Failure provides a comprehensive synthesis of this family of objections.  As he succinctly 
expresses his thesis:  "Behind every model of government failure is an assumption of 
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extreme voter stupidity, serious lack of competition, or excessively high 
negotiation/transfer costs." (1989, p.1421) 
 
"Extreme voter stupidity."  Most public choice economists would instantly counter that 
they assume voter ignorance, not “stupidity” or "irrationality." But Wittman maintains that 
they are abusing basic information economics.  Ignorance is not sufficient for their 
conclusions because on the standard rational expectations assumption, ignorance only 
increases estimates' variance; it does not cause systematic error.  Being ignorant about 
government spending in no way implies a tendency to underestimate its level.  Being 
ignorant about protectionism does not mean that you think it works better than it really 
does.  Once you grant this point, basic statistics has a strong implication: No matter how 
severe individuals' ignorance, their mistakes balance out as long as the electorate is 
reasonably large.  Voter ignorance as such does not tip the electoral scales in favor of 
pork or protectionism. 
 
But what about politicians who, under the influence of special interests, preach free trade 
but secretly practice protection?  As long as the probability of discovery exceeds zero, 
voters have a simple expedient: dire punishment.  This is standard Beckerian logic: As 
the probability of punishment falls, its severity must rise.  Suppose, for example, that a 
politician is "caught on tape" accepting a small bribe.  Ignorant voters could effectively 
deter such behavior by throwing him out of office, out of public life entirely, or into jail.  
And since no politician can ever be 100 percent sure that he will escape detection, 
incentives to stay honest can exist even if dishonesty usually pays.  Consider the 
damage politicians have done to their careers with minor lapses like stealing stamps, 
making personal calls at government expense, or characterizing a budget as "niggardly." 
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A natural objection is that politicians manipulate voters with biased information.  Once 
again, a straightforward theoretical response exists: Ignorant does not mean gullible.  A 
rationally ignorant economic actor discounts information according to its reliability.  If he 
is so ignorant that he cannot distinguish differences in reliability, he can still greet all 
sources with uniform common sense skepticism.  Uncritically swallowing empty 
promises is stupidity, not ignorance.  Thus, ignorant auto buyers do not hypnotically buy 
a car because the dealer enthusiastically claims it is "the deal of a lifetime."  Until the 
expected benefit exceeds the expected cost, they wait.  This in turn gives dealers an 
incentive to raise the expected benefits with guarantees, third-party inspection, 
reputation, and so on.  Similarly, if voters cannot tell good programs from bad, they can 
adopt a "when in doubt, oppose" stance.  If guarantees, inspection, and reputation are 
as politically feeble as many public choice scholars assert, the consequence, counter 
intuitively, would be less government.  Voters and politicians would stand at a cheap talk 
impasse.       
  
Note that Wittman only demonstrates that some standard public choice arguments are 
logically invalid; the premises do not imply the conclusions.  It does not follow that the 
conclusions are wrong.  Indeed, Wittman eagerly grants that if voters were "stupid," or, 
in technical terms, irrational, then the standard conclusions could be logically deduced. If 
voters have blind faith in their leaders, wasteful programs multiply like rabbits.  Wittman, 
however, is relying on economists' deep-rooted aversion to irrationality-based 
explanations.  He calculates, probably correctly, that most economists will admit that 
"political failure is largely a myth," before they will admit that "voters are irrational." 
 
"Serious lack of competition."  Political failure arguments often appeal to monopoly 
power instead of voter ignorance.  Those who fret over the dangers of collusion each 
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time an industry's concentration ratio inches up often see nothing wrong with more than 
a century of political duopoly in the United States.  If the Democrats and Republicans 
colluded, the only way to stop them would be to incur the enormous expense of forming 
a third party. 
 
For old-fashioned structure-conduct-performance economists committed to the perfectly 
competitive benchmark, these arguments have considerable force.  But many 
economists see this benchmark as flawed (Bork 1993; Rothbard 1993; Armentano 
1999). Ubiquitous real-world conditions - especially economies of scale - make the 
pursuit of an atomistic market structure extremely questionable.  A smaller number of 
firms makes collusion easier, but it hardly implies that it becomes easy.  Indeed, even a 
single firm may act competitively due to the threat of potential competition.   
 
Once one recognizes the wrong-headedness of the perfectly competitive benchmark for 
markets, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the benchmark is equally misguided in 
politics.  Political parties have obvious scale economies, especially where information is 
concerned.  Imagine exogenously creating hundreds of new parties.  At first, voters 
would be horribly confused.  But it would not be a stable equilibrium.  Political 
competition would swiftly eliminate most of the parties by merger and attrition until the 
dust settled and voters once again felt comfortable choosing between the available 
"brands."  Admittedly, this effect is less extreme under proportional representation.  But 
even in multi-party systems, there are usually far fewer parties than politicians, and scale 
economies are the most natural explanation.9 
 
What about barriers to entry?  Those who use the perfectly competitive benchmark often 
put the "barrier" label on everything from product differentiation to capital requirements.  
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But critics have pointed out the absurdity of this approach.  After all, incumbent firms had 
to face the same "barriers" when they started out.  The main barriers worthy of attention 
are legal restrictions on entry.   
 
These admittedly exist in democracy to some degree.  Members of third parties 
frequently recount their annual quest to gather signatures to get on the ballot.  But many 
such "barriers" can be credibly interpreted as an effort to make voters' lives easier, not to 
limit their choices.  Without signature or other requirements, the federal ballot would be 
as thick as a phone book.  The number of candidates would number in the thousands, 
but almost no one would want to vote for the new additions.   
 
In any case, it is hard to see that legal restrictions on political competition have much 
effect on policy.  Can anyone seriously claim that the Libertarian Party or Green Party's 
low vote shares are primarily due to some factor other than the extreme unpopularity of 
the policies they favor?10  Third parties have done well historically as long as they 
enjoyed the support of a significant fraction of the electorate, like Theodore Roosevelt's 
Progressives in 1912 or Ross Perot's Reform Party in 1992.  Moreover, political 
scientists have long observed that major parties quickly adopt third-party planks that 
strike a responsive chord, just as standard models of potential entry predict. (Stone and 
Rapoport 2001) 
 
"Excessively high negotiation/transfer costs."  A final class of political failure arguments 
relies on neither voter ignorance nor imperfect political competition.  The problem, 
instead, is that voting fails to adjust for preference intensities, so winning policies may be 
highly inefficient.  Rent control is a classic example: if 1,000 tenants each gain $1, and 
10 landlords each lose $200, democracy imposes rent control, with a net monetary loss 
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of $1,000.  The obvious corrective mechanism is political bargaining; landlords could 
bribe each tenant $1.50 to the benefit of both groups.  If bargaining is expensive, 
however, the problem may remain severe. 
 
Wittman has several lines of response to these concerns.  Above all else, representative 
democracy greatly reduces transactions costs relative to unanimity. "Agreements" that 
require 51 percent approval instead of 100 percent, like a regular contract, are cheaper 
to forge.  It costs less for a few hundred "representatives" to make a deal than a hundred 
million citizens.   
 
A second provocative point Wittman makes is that bundling can often reduce the cost of 
political transactions.  If there are a thousand small impositions, each of which costs less 
than the transactions‟ costs of repeal, a clever legislator could propose an "omnibus 
repeal bill" to eliminate them all in one swoop.  This logic was in play for the military base 
closing legislation of the 1990s.  And to his predictive credit, Wittman made this point a 
couple years before the Cold War ended. (1989, p.1409-12)    
 
b.  Empirics: The Status Quo is Popular 
Positivists might dismiss Wittman's analysis as a priori theorizing, but Austrians cannot.  
Either way, looking at the empirical evidence is worthwhile.  If Wittman is right about 
political competition, then the policy status quo should be popular.     
 
Two main empirical approaches are possible here.  The first puts the onus of proof on 
the critics with the following challenge: Name the policies that now exist in the United 
States that a majority does not want.  Tariffs and quotas?  In fact, strong empirical 
evidence suggests that the public favors at least as much protectionism as we now 
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have. (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Rielly 1999)11  Pork barrel spending?  
Representative surveys of the U.S. population like the General Social Survey (1998; 
henceforth GSS), conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University 
of Chicago, show that solid majorities favor current spending levels on pork‟s classic 
expressions, bridge and highway spending. (Table 1) If not these, then what? 
 
The second empirical approach is to demonstrate that at least the quantitatively 
significant features of existing policy are in fact popular.  Take Social Security.  The 
standard public choice explanation blames AARP lobbying and high turnout of elderly 
voters.  But the GSS routinely finds that an overwhelming majority favors as much or 
more spending for this program than now exists. (Table 1)  Support for cuts stands in the 
single digits.     
 
Similar patterns can be seen for most of the big-ticket items in the federal budget; if 
anything, Americans are getting less government than they want. (Table 1)  As a general 
rule, support for spending on the environment, health care, education, crime, and anti-
drug programs is overwhelming.  Public opinion is solidly behind spending for Social 
Security, infrastructure, and parks.  National defense is less popular - those who favor 
cuts typically outnumber those who favor increases.  But the median respondent favors 
the status quo.  The only categories of spending that a majority wants to cut are space 
exploration and welfare (intermittently) and foreign aid (invariably).  And even on welfare, 
opposition is tenuous; government-funded job training is more than twice as popular as 
dropping recipients from the rolls and expecting them to find low-skill jobs. (National 
Survey of Public Knowledge of Welfare Reform and the Federal Budget, 1995, Question 
19).  
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Admittedly, interpreting survey evidence is tricky.  A large majority of GSS respondents 
also expresses general support for cutting government spending.  But when you ask for 
specifics, they only favor cuts in a handful of relatively small programs.  When offered a 
realistic trade-off, most of the public balks.  Thus, when asked, "If the government had a 
choice between reducing taxes or spending more on social programs like health care, 
social security, and unemployment benefits, which do you think it should do?" the split 
was roughly 40/60 in favor of more spending.12 
 
What about regulation?  At the most abstract level, Americans who want less outnumber 
those who want more.  The median position favored less regulation during 1983-7, the 
status quo during 1988-91, and stood right at the border in 1996.  But on closer 
examination, this moderate hostility to regulation turns out to be superficial.  Americans 
who believe that it is "government's responsibility to keep prices under control" 
predominate more than 2:1.  About 80 percent of Americans think that government 
should "require businesses to provide consumers with the information they need to make 
informed choices."  Industrial policy for both high-tech and declining industries enjoys 
majority support.  The median American persistently favors "government financing of 
projects to create new jobs," and at least does not oppose French-style "work sharing," 
though he does reject the view that government should "provide a job for everyone who 
wants one."13  
 
One particularly interesting set of questions in the GSS asks respondents whether 
various industries should be government-owned, private with regulated prices and 
profits, or private without these regulations. Preferences and actual policy turn out to 
match rather cleanly.  The majority wants regulation but not government ownership for 
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electric power, mass transit, banking, and insurance.  It favors private ownership without 
price/profit regulation for steel and cars.14  
 
Thus on regulation, too, the public is largely content with the status quo.  When the man 
on the street complains about regulation in abstract terms, it does not mean that he 
prefers to rely on market forces.  What he wants is to "cut red tape," to streamline 
existing regulations. 
 
Our point is not that no unpopular policies exist.  But bona fide examples are hard to 
come by, and quantitatively significant ones are scarcer still.  Foreign aid is genuinely 
unpopular.  But it absorbs roughly one percent of the federal budget; complete abolition 
of foreign aid would leave the size of government almost unchanged.  Immigration 
restrictions are a more substantial deviation from voter preferences - for being too lax.  
In 1994, close to a 2/3 majority wanted less immigration, and the modal response was 
"decrease a lot."  If you cast a broader net, you can find other occasional departures 
from majority preferences.  As recently as 1998, for example, most Americans continued 
to want greater scope for prayer in school.15  Overall, however, "What is, is popular," is a 
fair generalization.16 
 
c.  Theory: Rational Irrationality 
Traditional public choice avoids any appeal to voter irrationality, often making it 
tantamount to rejecting economics itself.  After all, voters are also consumers, workers, 
and investors; to say that voters are irrational is to say that people are irrational.  In a 
series of papers, however, Caplan (2000, 2001, 2002) turns the standard view upside-
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down, maintaining that basic economic theory implies that otherwise rational actors tend 
to become irrational on political matters.   
 
Caplan begins with the observation that people often have preferences over beliefs.  
Embracing specific beliefs gives their lives meaning, makes them feel better about 
themselves, or helps them get along with important people in their lives.  Religious and 
political beliefs are the classic examples, a point eloquently driven home in Eric Hoffer's 
classic The True Believer (1951).  When people become libertarians, for example, they 
often feel like the world makes sense, that they have a purpose (to advance liberty), and 
that they are better people than statists.  To abandon libertarianism would be to lose all 
of these psychological benefits - and possibly a lot of libertarian friends.  Even if a 
libertarian stumbled on the conclusive disproof of his worldview, changing his mind has 
both psychological and social drawbacks. 
 
Of course, reality itself gives us reasons to change our minds: False beliefs can lead to 
disastrous consequences.  If you believe you can fly, you will not believe it for long.  On 
the other hand, false beliefs do not inexorably lead to practical failure.  Unless you are 
pursuing a career in biology, rejecting evolution is unlikely to affect your lifespan or your 
bank account. 
 
All this points toward an economic theory of irrationality:  Conceptualize actors as trading 
off between material wealth and cherished beliefs.  More of one means less of the other.  
From here, it is easy to draw a "demand for irrationality" curve, where the quantity of 
irrationality falls as its price in terms of material wealth rises. (Figure 1)  Thus, one can 
be rationally irrational, in the sense that consumption of irrationality responds to its 
implicit price in terms of real-world success.  
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Now recall the standard argument for rational ignorance: being ignorant about politics is 
rational because one vote does not matter anyway.  You could safely vote at random.  
Caplan maintains that this zero cost of error has broader implications than usually 
appreciated.  Returning to the demand for irrationality diagram, notice that democracy 
makes irrationality a free good.  Like a diner at an all-you-can-eat buffet, the voter's 
incentive is to "satiate" his desire for irrational beliefs - to embrace whatever crazy 
policies appeal to him, no matter how deadly they would be in practice.   
 
A common response to Caplan's pessimistic assessment of voter incentives is that 
policy disasters give the necessary incentive to think rationally.  But this objection 
conveniently overlooks basic marginal analysis.  If one person in a nation plagued by 
bad economic policy reads Bastiat and changes his mind, does policy change?  The 
answer is almost certainly no.  All that happens is that the lone voice of reason becomes 
a social pariah.  At the margin, policy failures provide no added incentive to be rational. 
 
What about politicians?  Do they have an incentive to be rational?  Yes and no.  
Politicians do have an incentive to rationally assess the public's response to their 
actions.  It is less clear, however, that politicians have an incentive to think rationally 
about what their policies will really accomplish.  If the people want rent control and favor 
politicians who agree, what good does it do for a politician to know that their economic 
analysis is defective?   
 
Caplan (2001a, 2001b, 2003) spell out the implications of rational irrationality in detail.  
Many standard public choice theorems remain unchanged.  Politicians still compete for 
the public's affections by catering to their policy preferences.  Yet other attributes of 
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democracy change.  Above all else, the presumption that popular policies serve majority 
interests is overturned.      
 
d.  Empirics: Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics 
Wittman's rejection of claims about systematic voter errors is strident.  But his position is 
at least the tacit consensus.  To assert that a public choice position assumes voter bias 
is widely considered a strong objection.  A political economist accused of assuming voter 
bias is far more likely to deny the charge than to insist that the assumption is justified. 
 
Why are economists so skittish?  Have the claims of Bastiat and Mises about voters' 
systematic errors suffered a decisive empirical defeat?  Not at all.  The objections are 
only theoretical: Systematic errors are inconsistent with the now-standard assumption of 
rational expectations. But the last section showed how unconvincing this position is in 
pure theory.  Under the circumstances, empirical work is likely to be profitable. 
 
If rational expectations holds, we should expect the average beliefs of laymen and 
experts to be identical.17  If they are not, we can infer that rational expectations fails to 
hold for at least one of the groups. A reasonable presumption, moreover, is that when 
laymen and experts conflict, the experts are correct.  The presumption is defeasible: the 
experts might be ideologically biased or have a vested interest in their views.  But as a 
general rule, the burden of proof has to rest on the critics. 
    
Now a substantial literature examines the economic beliefs of both experts—
professional economists—and laymen (Blendon et al 1997; Rhoads, 1985; Walstad, 
1997). The results are generally consistent with the Mises-Bastiat view: the public seems 
more protectionist, more focused on "saving jobs," and more skeptical of the market than 
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economists. But an apples-to-apples comparison is difficult because surveys usually 
target either economists or the public, posing different questions. .   
 
Fortunately, there is one excellent exception to the rule: the Survey of Americans and 
Economists on the Economy (henceforth SAEE).  This study, produced by the Kaiser 
Family Foundation, the Washington Post, and Harvard, asked 1,510 randomly sampled 
Americans and 250 Ph.D. economists the same wide-ranging battery of questions about 
the economy. (Blendon et al. 1997)  The authors of the study found strong prima facie 
evidence of lay-expert belief gaps on almost all questions.   
 
Analyzing the data set, Caplan (2002) shows that these belief gaps are quite robust.  
The effect of economic training is statistically significant for more than 80 percent of the 
questions, and typically very large in size.  Furthermore, the two most popular theories 
that question economists' objectivity can be rejected.  Controlling for "self-serving bias" 
using variables like income, income growth, job security, gender, and race only slightly 
reduces the absolute magnitude of the gaps.  The reason why economists and the public 
disagree is not that economists are materially well-off.  Rich non-economists generally 
think like poor non-economists, not rich economists.  Controlling for "ideological bias" 
with party identification and left-right ideological placement actually slightly increases 
belief gaps' absolute magnitude.  The reason why economists and the public disagree is 
not that economists are conservative ideologues. In fact, the typical economist surveyed 
is a moderate Democrat. 
 
Modern data seems quite consistent with the Mises-Bastiat dissection of the public's 
misconceptions.  The public suffers from a strong anti-foreign bias, a tendency to 
underrate the economic benefits and overrate the dangers of dealing with people from 
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other countries.  It exhibits what Bastiat calls "Sisyphism" - seeing employment as a 
good in itself rather than a means to the end of production.  Non-economists also display 
a powerful anti-market bias.  They resist supply-and-demand explanations of price 
determination in favor of monopolistic conspiracy theories.  And as Bastiat put it, they 
habitually focus on "what is seen" to the neglect of "what is not seen."  Thus, the SAEE 
indicates that public naively sees profits, executive compensation, and business taxes 
as mere transfers between rich and poor, and rarely considers their effect on incentives.     
 
We hope further empirical work will explore the robustness of these findings across the 
world and over time.18  In a sense, though, data limitations make the match between his 
findings and the writings of Bastiat and Mises more impressive.  Bastiat's generalizations 
about public opinion come largely from his experiences in 19th century France.  Mises' 
life experience took him all over Europe, but he was almost sixty years old by the time 
he emigrated to the United States.  That their writings could so aptly describe late 20th 
century America suggests that Bastiat and Mises identified deep errors, not transient 
aberrations.  
    
6.  Old Ideas, New Directions 
If the public choice of Mises and Bastiat is as prescient as we claim, it stands to reason 
that their work would be a fruitful source of new ideas.  This section points to what we 
see as the most pregnant themes in their writings, but it is only meant to be suggestive.  
In part, we hope to whet the reader's curiosity, prompting political economists to read 
Mises and Bastiat more closely. 
 
When misconceptions matter.  Both Mises and Bastiat admit that economics is not 
unique in being misunderstood.  Most disciplines have failed to communicate even their 
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rudimentary conclusions to laymen.  But Mises and Bastiat add that widespread 
misconceptions are harmless for some disciplines, but deadly in others.  According to 
Mises: 
The fact that the masses are ignorant of physics and do not know anything 
substantial about electricity does not obstruct the endeavors of experts who 
utilize the teachings of science for the satisfaction of the wants of the 
consumers... [T]heir ignorance regarding the achievements of the natural 
sciences does not endanger our spiritual and material welfare.  It is quite different 
in the field of economics. (1981b, p. 325) 
 
How so?   
In the market economy the realization of technological innovations does not 
require anything more than the cognizance of their reasonableness by one or a 
few enlightened spirits... They are free to embark upon their projects even if 
everyone else laughs at them. Later, when the new, better and cheaper products 
appear on the market, these scoffers will scramble for them. However dull a man 
may be, he knows how to tell the difference between a cheaper shoe and a more 
expensive one, and to appreciate the usefulness of new products. 
  
But it is different in the field of social organization and economic policies. Here 
the best theories are useless if not supported by public opinion. (1998a, p. 863) 
 
Bastiat takes a similar position.  You do not have to grasp the principles of engineering 
to enjoy a watch, locomotive, or steamship.  But other sciences exist "that influence the 
public only in proportion to the understanding of them that the public itself has, and that 
derive all their efficacy, not from the knowledge accumulated by a few exceptionally 
learned men, but from that diffused among mankind in general. These include ethics, 
hygiene, political economy, and, in countries where men are their own masters, politics."  
 
So both Mises and Bastiat divide folly into the influential and the epiphenomenal.  But 
how do they draw the line, and why?  For Mises, the key distinction is apparently private 
versus collective choice.  If consumers judge the applications of an idea, Mises does not 
worry whether the man in the street grasps underlying theories.  Good ideas sell, bad 
ideas flop.  If however voters judge the applications of an idea, Mises sees no filter other 
than their directly assessment of the idea.  
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Reviewing Bastiat's list shows that he draws the line differently.  One of his chief 
examples - hygiene - lies on the private choice side of the ledger.  He is not tacitly 
pointing to externalities; context shows that he is talking about health in general, not 
contagious diseases alone.  Mises would presumably respond that: "However dull a man 
may be, he knows how to tell the difference between health and sickness, and to 
appreciate the usefulness of new treatments."  But Bastiat is roughly as pessimistic 
about the prevalence and damage of "hygiene sophistry" as he is about economic 
sophistry.  
 
One important question to consider, then, is: Which dividing line is closer to the truth - 
Mises' or Bastiat's?  Caplan's (2001) rational irrationality model coheres well with Mises' 
account: irrational views about hygiene are risky for your health and your wallet.  But 
recent research in health economics provide some suggestive evidence for Bastiat's 
claim.  Medical quackery appears to have held a substantial market share for a long time 
(Gardner 1957), and the public may overestimate the marginal impact of spending on 
medicine on health (Newhouse et al 1993).  
 
It should also be realized that modern political conditions may have moved the line.  In 
Bastiat or Mises' day, misconceptions about natural science had few policy implications.  
Given modern environmental policies, however, systematically biased beliefs about 
physics or chemistry could be harmful indeed.  Overestimates of the risk of nuclear 
power or global warming hardly seem epiphenomenal.  In fact, a fascinating comparison 
of lay-expert beliefs about toxicology (Kraus, Malmfors, and Slovic 1991) finds 
ubiquitous systematic errors on the part of the public.  Their findings highlight the 
plausibility of linking foolish environmental policies to scientific misconceptions. 
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Intellectuals and public opinion.  Both Mises and Bastiat frequently trace the public's 
misconceptions back to intellectuals.  In a characteristic statement, Mises (1998a, p. 
864) assures us that "The masses, the hosts of common men, do not conceive any 
ideas, sound or unsound.  They only choose between the ideologies developed by the 
intellectual leaders of mankind."  It follows that socialist intellectuals are to blame for the 
popularity of socialism: 
The masses favor socialism because they trust the socialist propaganda of the 
intellectuals.  The intellectuals, not the populace, are molding public opinion.  It is 
a lame excuse of the intellectuals that they must yield to the masses.  They 
themselves have generated the socialist ideas and indoctrinated the masses with 
them. (1981a, p. 540) 
 
 
Given this view, it is not surprising that the Mises-Bastiat strategy for making the world 
better is to convert the intellectuals to free-market ideas.  A new generation of right-
thinking intellectuals can then undo the damage caused by earlier ones.  Bastiat 
supported economists' "hand-to-hand struggle, this ever reviving combat with popular 
error." (1964a, p. 121)  Mises makes an impassioned plea to fellow intellectuals: 
If we want to avoid the destruction of Western civilization and the relapse into 
primitive wretchedness, we must change the mentality of our fellow citizens. We 
must make them realize what they owe to the much vilified "economic freedom," 
the system of free enterprise and capitalism. (1981b, p. 325) 
 
 
These are stimulating hypotheses, and flattering to the intellectual's ego.  To what extent 
are they correct? Do intellectuals control the world? The history of religion provides a 
possible counterexample.  Until recent centuries, almost all intellectuals in the Western 
world actively promoted some form of Christianity.  A cynic might claim that the masses' 
religious beliefs were a mere reflection of the religious beliefs of the cognitive elite.  But 
the last two centuries provide an interesting test.  Intellectuals have become markedly 
more critical of religion.  And while one might argue that the public has become more 
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secular as well, much of the public has refused to follow the intellectuals' lead.  Their 
influence over the public is far from complete. 
 
Similarly, while economists exert influence over popular economic beliefs, evidence 
suggests that sophistry has a life of its own.  Only a handful of modern economists 
promote anti-foreign bias or make-work bias.  Economists from the entire political 
spectrum agree on the biases‟ folly. But anti-foreign and make-work bias remain popular 
with the public. 
 
Any economist who has taught introductory students knows how hard rooting such 
fallacies out is.  You might lament that other intellectuals "got to your students first."  But 
this requires a puzzling asymmetry: Why is putting fallacies into students so easy, but 
taking them out so hard?  Is there a powerful first-mover advantage?  Or perhaps, 
contrary to Mises, the masses are not a blank slate for intellectuals to write on.  Maybe 
most of the public would endorse economic fallacies without any outside prodding.  
Bastiat hints at this when he remarks that "The good [of protection] is apparent to the 
outer eye; the harm reveals itself only to the inner eye of the mind." (1964a, p. 4) 
 
This does not mean that the hopes of Mises and Bastiat for improving economic literacy 
are in vain.  Indeed, Caplan (2001) finds that education makes people think "more like 
economists," which is consistent with theory that economists are already making a 
difference.  Still, it suggests that some mistakes will be easier to root out than others. 
 
One plausible hypothesis is that ideas originating with intellectuals are easier to 
permanently change than ideas that originate with the public itself.  Take the fall of 
socialism. As Mises emphasizes, intellectuals created socialism and then sold it to the 
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public.  While socialist ideas inspired a couple of generations, they lacked staying power.  
Inside socialist regimes, intellectuals were unable to keep the faith alive, and began to 
lose faith themselves.  In the outside world, critics of socialism regained the intellectual 
high ground and moved public opinion in the opposite direction.  Traditional socialism 
seems unlikely to revive anytime soon, though perhaps some shrewd "repackaging" of 
the socialist ideal will be enough to confound that expectation.19 
 
In contrast, protectionism has been harder to permanently defeat.  For Mises, one of the 
great successes in the history of political economy was the 19th century free trade 
movement.  But this victory did not last.  Public opinion data is lacking, but we suspect 
that public conversion to free trade was at best superficial.  Perhaps anti-foreign bias 
was only dormant, waiting to be revived by the next macroeconomic shock.  
 
Special interests and public opinion.  How do special interests and public opinion 
interact?  Mises and Bastiat present two slightly different mechanisms.  One is to directly 
influence public opinion in the interests‟ favor.  Politicians then respond to the change in 
public opinion by adopting policies more favorable to the special interest group in 
question.  Thus, Bastiat observes that: 
To rob the public, it is necessary to deceive it. To deceive it is to persuade it that 
it is being robbed for its own benefit, and to induce it to accept, in exchange for 
its property, services that are fictitious or often even worse. This is the purpose of 
sophistry, whether it be theocratic, economic, political, or monetary. (1964a, p. 
125-6) 
 
Mises often tells the same story.  At other times, though, he has a different mechanism 
in mind: a "co-factor theory" in which public opinion sets the ground rules, but 
competitive rent-seeking determines the victors. If nobody plays, nobody wins: 
There were and there will always be people whose selfish ambitions demand 
protection for vested interests and who hope to derive advantage from measures 
restricting competition... Whether or not their desire to make economic conditions 
 33 
rigid and to hinder improvements can be realized, depends on the climate of 
public opinion. (1998a, p.268) 
 
Mises' thesis, apparently, is that special interests take advantage of the leeway provided 
by preexisting public opinion.  Thus, although the public favors industrial policy for 
declining industries in general terms, the overall level and direction of industrial policy 
might still depend on lobbying effort.  If no industry bothered to lobby, an industrial policy 
might not emerge despite the public's sympathies.   
 
The slippery slope.  Mises is a firm believer in the slippery slope of government 
intervention.  His mechanism hinges, as usual, on public opinion: 
Popular opinion ascribes all these evils to the capitalistic system.  As a remedy 
for the undesirable effects of interventionism they ask for still more 
interventionism.  They blame capitalism for the effects of the actions of 
governments which pursue an anti-capitalistic policy. (1998b, p.78) 
 
On this account, the public not only underestimates the benefits of the market economy; 
it also overestimates the probability that the market is to blame for new problems.  Even 
a mild anti-market bias can potentially snowball out of control.  For example, Mises 
repeatedly blames the rise of economic nationalism on domestic interventionism.  
 
One need not interpret Mises' slippery slope argument as predictive. (Ikeda 1997)  
Despite his grim predictions, no Western economy decayed into full-blown socialism, 
and the heavily regulated labor markets of the European Union have not prevented its 
move to internal free trade.  This does not mean, though, that Mises' idea is without 
merit.  Maybe he merely overlooked some countervailing forces.  
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Limiting democracy.  If democracy cannot be trusted to deliver sound economic policies, 
what about rule by an economically literate elite - a liberal dictatorship?  Mises takes a 
strong stand against free-market vanguardism:  
[V]ictory... can be won only with the weapons of the intellect, never by force. The 
suppression of all opposition by sheer violence is a most unsuitable way to win 
adherents to one's cause. Resort to naked force—that is, without justification in 
terms of intellectual arguments accepted by public opinion—merely gains new 
friends for those whom one is thereby trying to combat. (1978, p.50) 
 
Vanguardism is most appealing, of course, if only temporary - if a brief suspension of a 
democracy with bad policies lays the groundwork for a democracy with good policies. 
This, Mises observed during the last years of the British and French empires, is a 
common rationale for colonialism.  He was unconvinced: 
Attempts have been made to extenuate and gloss over the true motive of colonial 
policy with the excuse that its sole object was to make it possible for primitive 
peoples to share in the blessings of European civilization.  Even assuming that 
this was the real objective... the liberal could not see any adequate basis for 
regarding this kind of colonization as useful or beneficial.  If, as we believe, 
European civilization really is superior... it should be able to prove its superiority 
by inspiring these peoples to adopt it of their own accord.  Could there be a more 
doleful proof of the sterility of European civilization than that it can be spread by 
no other means than fire and sword? (1978, p.125) 
 
Abroad as at home, resort to naked force discredits one's own ideas. 
 
Mises‟ argument is stimulating.  But are matters always the way he suggests?  
Pinochet's Chilean dictatorship is one troubling counterexample.  By seizing power, 
implementing unpopular market-oriented reforms and letting the country see the results, 
Pinochet's regime changed people's minds.  The return of democracy left his economic 
policies largely in place. (Stallings and Brock 1993; Sachs 1990)  To take a milder 
example, advisors to transition economies often favor a "reform first, ask the public later" 
approach. (Sachs 1994)  This supposedly improves long-run policy quality, whether by 
"winning hearts and minds" or mere inertia.  
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Bastiat is sympathetic to a less radical departure from democratic principles: franchise 
restriction.  He frankly states that "the right to suffrage rests on the presumption of 
capacity." (1964c, p. 57)  His rationale, to use modern language, is voter-on-voter 
externalities:  
And why is incapacity a cause of exclusion?  Because it is not the voter alone 
who must bear the consequences of his vote; because each vote involves and 
affects the whole community; because the community clearly has the right to 
require some guarantee as to the acts on which its welfare and existence 
depend. (1964c, p. 57-8)   
 
While Bastiat is not fully convinced, he takes the logic seriously.  Perhaps modern 
political economists should as well. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
Mises' critique of Enlightenment liberalism applies almost verbatim to modern rational 
choice political economy: 
They blithely assumed that what is reasonable will carry on merely on account of 
its reasonableness.  They never gave a thought to the possibility that public 
opinion could favor spurious ideologies whose realization would harm welfare 
and well-being and disintegrate social cooperation... They did not anticipate the 
popularity which ideas which they would have called reactionary, superstitious, 
and unreasonable acquired in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  They were 
so fully imbued with the assumption that all men are endowed with the faculty of 
correct reasoning that they entirely misconstrued the meaning of the portents.  
(1998b, p. 864-5) 
 
The only difference is the degree of naïveté.  The Enlightenment liberals - with obvious 
exceptions like Bastiat - were refuted by events in the future.  Modern political economy 
has been refuted by events in the past.   
 
For many social scientists, the assumption of voter rationality is so a priori convincing 
that practically nothing could change their minds.  They meet counter-evidence each 
time they grade exams, but a firewall separates their daily experience from their 
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research program.  Thus, we have a curious spectacle: Mises, the notorious a priorist, 
shows more respect for facts than allegedly open-minded empiricists.   
 
Mises was not able to leapfrog over the mistakes of public choice because he was a 
subtler theorist.  His story is transparently simple.  Mises was not more insightful 
because he had more data.  He had less. Mises succeeded because he paid attention to 
the data he had.  He recognized that the question "Do voters have systematically biased 
beliefs about economics?" is an empirical one.  To answer it, he looked at the world, not 
a formal mathematical model. 
 
Mises' study of public opinion gave him a great advantage over other economists: sound 
microfoundations.  Once he saw the man on the street as he truly was, it became easy 
to explain why political competition fails to deliver efficient policies.  His view allowed him 
to appeal to voter demand instead of implausible conspiracy theories. 
 
Much of this article examines Mises and Bastiat retrospectively, showing how they 
independently reached recent discoveries. Reading Mises and Bastiat prospectively, to 
see what else they can teach us, is even more fascinating.  Considering their track 
record, even their mistakes are likely to be fruitful. 
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Table 1: Public Opinion on Government Spending 
 
"We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or 
inexpensively.  I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me 
whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. 
Are we spending too much money, too little money, or about the right amount on..." 
 
-1="too much money"      0="about the right amount"    1="too little money"             
 1983-87 1988-91 1994 1998 
 Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean 
Extremely Popular Spending 
improving/protecting the 
environment 
1 .54 1 .67 1 .53 1 .55 
health care 1 .56 1 .68 1 .58 1 .63 
improving the nation's 
education system 
1 .57 1 .66 1 .66 1 .65 
halting the rising  
crime rate 
1 .64 1 .67 1 .71 1 .56 
dealing with drug 
addiction  
1 .58 1 .61 1 .54 1 .51 
Popular Spending 
Social Security 1 .48 1 .50 0 .42 1 .53 
highways/bridges 0 .32 0 .32 0 .33 0 .30 
parks and recreation 0 .25 0 .27 0 .24 0 .29 
Marginally Popular Spending 
military/armaments/ 
defense 
0 -.19 0 -.24 0 -.18 0 -.14 
Unpopular Spending 
space exploration 0 -.29 0 -.24 -1 -.41 0 -.31 
Welfare 0 -.24 0 -.18 -1 -.49 0 -.42 
Extremely Unpopular Spending 
foreign aid -1 -.68 -1 -.67 -1 -.70 -1 -.57 
Source: General Social Survey (Multiple Years). Variable identifiers NATENVIR, NATHEAL, 
NATEDUC, NATCRIME, NATDRUG, NATSOC, NATROAD, NATPARK,  NATARMS, NATSPAC, 
NATFARE, and NATAID. 
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Figure 1: The Demand for Irrationality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P 
Quantity of Irrationality 
Price of Irrationality 
with Practical 
Consequences 
Price of Irrationality 
without Practical 
Consequences 
D 
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1 "I do not hold that Bastiat was a bad theorist.  I hold that he was no theorist." 
Schumpeter (1954, p. 500)   
2 For Mises, public opinion refers largely to the public's beliefs about the effects of 
government policy, as well as policy preferences based on those beliefs.  Unlike Kuran 
(1995), Mises does not emphasize the tendency of social pressure to make members of 
the public hide their true policy beliefs.  We thank a referee for asking us to elaborate on 
this point. 
3
  At the same time, Mises has great confidence in the ability of the man in the street to 
make wise consumption decisions.  He takes issue with those who see the common 
man as "a helpless infant, badly in need of a paternal guardian to protect him against the 
sly tricks of a band of rogues." (1998 a, p.735)  Thus, while Mises often describes the 
public in harsh terms, what he questions is their political competence, not their ability to 
run their own lives or their overall character.  Indeed, as an anonymous referee points 
out, Mises' sees collectivist intellectuals as much more blameworthy than the common 
man. 
4 Before the rational expectations revolution, most economists saw "irrationality" as 
essentially equivalent to "having intransitive preferences," and referred to action based 
on intransitive preferences as "irrational behavior."  The rational expectations revolution 
shifted attention away from the rationality of behavior to the rationality of beliefs.  The 
assumption of rational expectations rules out systematic and/or predictable errors, but 
explicitly allows for random errors with zero mean.  Economists have come to equate the 
former type of erroneous belief with "irrationality," and the latter type with "ignorance."  
We follow this usage throughout the paper. 
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5 An anonymous referee points out that Mises appears to take the opposite position 
elsewhere in his writings.  In a characteristic passage, Mises tells us that: “Human action 
is necessarily always rational. The term „rational action‟ is therefore pleonastic and must 
be rejected as such.” (1998 a, p.19; emphasis added)  But the contradiction is only 
apparent.  Mises simply has a much lower threshold for "rationality" than modern 
economists do.  Mises' definition of "rationality" does not rule out illogical fanaticism; the 
definition of "rationality" prevalent since the rational expectations revolution does.   
 
Furthermore, Mises objects only to the phrase "irrational action," not "irrational belief."  
Indeed, Human Action contains an entire chapter on "Economics and the Revolt Against 
Reason," in which Mises rebuts those who "attack logic and reason and substitute 
mystical intuition for ratiocination." (1998 a, p.74)  Thus, while he refuses to say that 
people in "revolt against reason" are acting irrationally, he is quite willing to say that their 
beliefs are not rationally justifiable. 
6 A more radical point that often appears in the public choice literature is that the "will of 
the majority" is undefined due to social intransitivities; incompatible policies can often 
legitimately claim majority support.  Even with no agency problems whatever, an 
agenda-setting politician then has the discretion to choose any element of the set of 
policies able to command a majority.  Adding agency problems further expands the 
agenda-setter's choice. 
7 Almost all public choice scholars admit that democratic governments are dependent on 
public opinion to some degree.  Even Brennan and Buchanan's Leviathan model of 
democracy is a tool for "worst-case" thinking, not a literal description.  (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1985). 
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8 Indeed, even if one voter happened to learn the truth, it would rarely be worth doing 
anything about it: Mailing a letter of protest to your congressman usually costs more than 
your share of the cost of any one program.   
9 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
10 Indeed, subsidized publicity would arguably reduce the vote shares of radical third 
parties.  Many, perhaps most, of their votes come from disenchanted citizens who 
sympathize with the third parties' general aspirations, but who would be repelled by their 
radical platforms. 
11 The most interesting piece of counter-evidence is that large majorities embrace free 
trade if combined with assistance for displaced workers.  In the Worldviews (2002) 
survey, respondents' three choices are: free trade with worker assistance, free trade 
without worker assistance, and "I do not favor free trade."  Almost 75 percent select the 
first answer.  We would argue, however, that this is in large part a question-wording 
effect.  Most obviously, the last option should have been split into “no free trade + worker 
assistance” and “no free trade + no worker assistance.”  The binary choice between 
"free trade" and "no free trade" probably masks the public's preference for an 
intermediate policy.  And finally, the alternative to free trade should have been more 
positively labeled as e.g. "fair trade."   
12 See General Social Survey (1998) variable identifiers CUTGOVT and TAXSPEND. 
13 See General Social Survey (1998) variable identifiers LESSREG, PRICECON, 
REQINFO, HLPHITEC, SAVEJOBS, MAKEJOBS, CUTHOURS, and JOBSALL. 
14 See General Social Survey (1998) variable identifiers OWNPOWER, OWNMASS, 
OWNSTEEL, OWNBANKS, and OWNAUTOS. 
15 See General Social Survey (1998) variable identifiers LETIN and PRAYER.  One 
might want to attribute this to the undemocratic nature of the Supreme Court.  But 
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elected officials appoint the Justices.  Wittman would have to grant that politicians have 
all the usual incentives to make judicial appointments the electorate will approve. 
16 Modern public opinion research also generally finds, consistent with most of the 
observations of Mises and Bastiat on the subject, that narrow self-interest has little effect 
on political beliefs.  The rich are almost as supportive of redistribution as the poor, to 
take one classic example. (Sears and Funk 1990; Citrin and Green 1990) 
17 Note that this test will fail to detect deviations from rational expectations if both groups 
are identically biased.  
18 Rubin (2003), explicitly building on Caplan's analysis of the SAEE, tries to explain the 
public's systematically biased beliefs about economics using evolutionary psychology.  
Rubin argues that primitive man evolved in a largely zero-sum environment.  This in turn 
makes it difficult for modern human beings to comprehend the central features of 
modern positive-sum economies. 
19 We thank an anonymous referee for raising the latter possibility. 
